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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
FRANK DAVID GENTRY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No.: 
Category No. 13 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals decide a question of 
State law in a way that is in conflict with the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals decide an important 
question of State law which has not been, but should be settled by 
the Utah Supreme Court? 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals Opinion was issued on August 24, 
1990, and appears in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 
Ct. App. Aug., 1990) (a copy of the Court's opinion is contained in 
the Addendum). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this Petition 
under Utah Code Ann,, § 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For the purposes of this Brief In Opposition To The 
State's Petition For Writ of Certiorari to this Court, respondent 
incorporates and refers to the Petitioner's Statement Of The Case, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A recitation of the facts is not necessary for purposes 
of this Brief in Opposition to the State's Petition. 
The relevant facts are accurately summarized in the Court 
of Appeals Opinion. State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26-27. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE A 
QUESTION OF STATE LAW THAT IS IN CONFLICT 
WITH A DECISION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
The State's petition for a writ of certiorari must be 
summarily denied because the Utah Court of Appeals did not decide 
a question of State law that is in conflict with the decision of 
this Court as argued by the petitioner. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 1987) clearly mandates the trial court 
2 
must conduct an on-the-record review with the defendant before 
accepting the defendant's guilty plea. As the legislature and this 
Court have determined, it is essential that the trial courts 
consistently and routinely examine the defendants before accepting 
a guilty plea to a criminal offense because of the severe 
consequences that are attached to pleading guilty to a criminal 
offense. 
Specifically, Rule 11(5)(d) states: 
The court . . . may not accept the plea until 
the court has found: 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; . . . 
The State's reliance on Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P. 2d 1148 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990) and State v. 
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405, (Utah 1986), for the proposition that 
this court did not mean what it said in Gibbons, and cases 
thereafter1 is misplaced for three reasons: 
First, Jolivet and Miller concluded that the failure of 
the trial court to make a "finding on the record" is not critical 
so long as the record as a whole affirmatively demonstrates that 
]This Court clearly stated "that when a new rule of criminal 
procedure constitutes a clear break with the past, it will not be 
applied retroactively." State v. Hickman, 729 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1989) 
n. 1. Accordingly, this Court did not apply its strict 
construction rule to guilty pleas that pre-dated Gibbons. In the 
instant case defendants plea post-dated Gibbons. 
3 
the defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and under-
standing of the consequences and rights that the defendant is 
waiving. (Emphasis added). Not only did the trial court in this 
case fail to make this "finding on the record,11 the trial court 
failed to even pose the appropriate questions to the defendant to 
invoke necessary responses to determine whether the defendant was 
entering his plea voluntarily and whether he understood the facts 
and elements of the crime charged and its consequences. 
Second, in Jolivet the trial court (per Judge Brian's 
evidentiary hearing) made specific findings that the defendant 
understood the elements of the crimes charged and how those 
elements related to the facts. Jolivet at 1150. Therefore, this 
Court applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of review2. 
Third, in Jolivet, the defendant failed to provide the 
Supreme Court with a transcript, and therefore this Court assumed 
the regularity of the proceedings below. Jolivet at 1150. 
Petitioner's observation that this Court failed to point 
out that the plea entered in State v. Copeland, 765 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 
1988) , pre-dated its decision in Gibbons (as it did in State v. 
2This court could not make such a finding because the record 
was void of compliance with Rule 11. The trial court asked the 
State to review the record and demonstrate compliance with Rule 11. 
The State did not respond. In fact, the record is riddled with 
confusion as to what the defendant was charged with, bound over on 
from the Circuit Court and the penalties that attached. 
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Hickman), and therefore the record-as-a-whole test still exists, 
misconstrues the Court's language in Copeland and Gibbons. This 
Court took it upon itself to suggest ways to the trial court to 
ensure that the defendant understood the nature and the facts of 
the crime charged against him as required by the United States 
Supreme Court in McCarthy v. U.S. , 394 U.S. 459 (1969). This Court 
simply suggests that the most effective way would be for the 
defendant to state in his own words his understanding of the 
offense and the actions which make him guilty of the offense. 
Reading this Court's language in context, this Court said that it 
is the preferable way, but that the true test is one of 
voluntariness. This statement does not excuse or permit the trial 
court to not undertake its responsibilities and duties pursuant to 
Rule 11(5) and this Court's decision in Gibbons to examine the 
defendant to ensure that the defendant understands the facts and 
the nature of the elements charged against him. See State v. 
Copeland. 765 P.2d at 1273 (Utah 1988); State v. Gibbons at 1312. 
Obviously on appeal, the appellate courts must look to 
the record to determine whether, in fact, the trial court has 
strictly complied with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons. The Utah Court of 
Appeals correctly read this Court's decision in State v. Smith, 777 
P.2d 466 (Utah 1989). This Court said that in order for a 
defendant's guilty plea to be valid and in compliance with Rule 
5 
[11(6)5], Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Gibbons, the record 
must show that the defendant was unequivocally and clearly informed 
about the sentence that would be imposed. As this Court has 
pointed out, the procedure necessary to follow Rule [11(e)5] and 
Gibbons may take additional time, but constitutional rights may not 
be sacrificed in the name of judicial economy3. Gibbons at 1314. 
This Court's reasoning and rationale for requiring strict 
compliance with Rule 11(5) clearly demonstrates that the decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Gentry, was not in 
conflict with the decision of this Court in Gibbons. Accordingly, 
the petitionees writ of certiorari should be denied. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT 
DECIDE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW 
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED BY THIS COURT. 
Gibbons clearly instructs the trial court to conduct an 
on-the-record examination with the defendant to ensure Rule 11(5) 
3Even though there are hundreds and even thousands of guilty 
pleas entered in the various courts throughout the State of Utah, 
most trial courts routinely and consistently follow Rule 11 and 
State v. Gibbons, by examining the defendant to ensure that they 
have complied with the rules and this Court's holding to determine 
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty 
plea before said guilty plea is accepted by the trial Court. This 
procedure not only guarantees that defendant's constitutional 
rights will be upheld but also discourages or at least facilitates 
swift disposition of post-conviction attacks on the validity of the 
guilty plea because the trial judge will have produced a clear, 
adequate record for review (See Gibbons at 1314). 
6 
is complied with, thus assuring the defendant's plea of guilty is 
knowingly and voluntarily made. Each and every time this Court or 
the Utah Court of Appeals mentions the words "looking to the 
record" to determine whether the trial court has complied with Rule 
11(5) does not mean that the "record as a whole test" is being 
resurrected. It simply indicates that the appellate courts must 
look to the record to determine whether Rule 11(5) and Gibbons have 
been complied with. 
The defendant contends that the State should not be 
allowed to engage in semantics as a basis for requesting this Court 
to grant the State's petition for writ of certiorari asking this 
Court to clarify its ruling when the Gibbons opinion is clearly 
stated. 
Not only does the legislature, but also this Court 
correctly assert that before a guilty plea is accepted in a 
criminal case the trial court must strictly comply with Rule 11(5) 
to ensure that the defendant's guilty plea is knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. 
WHEREFORE, respondent submits that petitioner's writ of 
certiorari should be denied and attorney fees be awarded to 
respondent. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's logic that the "record as a whole test" is 
the most reasonable approach to avoid post-conviction attacks on 
the voluntariness of a guilty plea contradicts common sense. The 
penalties attached to criminal offenses both monetarily and 
involving one's liberty are severe. Before one subjects himself to 
the jurisdiction of the Court for sentencing, the trial court must 
strictly comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons to ensure that the 
defendant's constitutional rights are protected and to ensure that 
defendant is knowingly and voluntarily entering his guilty plea. 
Post-conviction attacks on the voluntariness of the guilty plea 
will be precluded or swiftly dealt with if the trial court simply 
takes the additional time to adequately examine the defendant 
before he enters his plea. To accept the position asserted by the 
petitioner leaves open the question whether there is enough infor-
mation on the record-as-a-whole to demonstrate that the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea even though the 
trial court failed to directly examine the defendant as to the 
facts and nature of the elements charged against the defendant. 
The record-as-a-whole test leaves open the question as to whether 
the defendant fully understood the nature of what he was doing and 
therefore should not be upheld. 
8 
WHEREFORE, the respondent asserts the State's petition 
for certiorari should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ ^ day of October, 1990. 
)L> jyya. I , (A)dm, 
GEORGE T/WAbDOUPS 
A t t o r n e y f o r R e s p o n d e n t 
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ADDENDUM 
U 1 l l tstH AHv R^p ?4 Provo, Utah 
been excluded, if thf defense was not to be 
permitted to call Alvin Barker in rebutial. 
Having concluded that the court erred in 
failing to exclude Deputy Troester's restate-
ment of Alvin Barker's opinion of Deputy 
Naylor's performance, we must now consider 
whether this error was harmless or prejudicial. 
An error is harmless, and not grounds for 
reversing a conviction, if, absent the error, 
there is no substantial likelihood of a better 
result for the defendant. Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(a); Srare v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 
(Utah 1989); Srare v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 116, 
120-122 (Utah 1989). 
In this case, one of the main points of the 
defense was that Deputy Naylor's use of force 
was excessive and overly aggressive. There 
were substantial factual discrepancies between 
the eyewitnesses' accounts of what happened, 
and Deputy Naylor's account (from which we 
have drawn the above statement of the facts) 
tends more to justify his role in this alterca-
tion than do the accounts of the Barker 
parents and of Gary Barker. In resolving this 
factual conflict, the testimony of Alvin Barker 
may well have been important. Alvin Barker 
intervened in the fight to aid Deputy Naylor in 
ending the struggle, but at trial, he saw no 
need for the deputy's resort to violence and 
portrayed Gary Barker's actions as mainly 
evasive and self-protective. Thus, the jury 
could well have found that Alvin Barker's 
testimony was critical in determining what 
happened, assessing the extent and nature of 
Gary Barker's resistance, and in evaluating his 
claim of self-defense. 
Given the conflicting evidence, and also in 
view of the rather lengthy jury deliberations, 
this appears to have been a close case factu-
ally. We therefore conclude that, if Alvin 
Barker's hearsay statement had been excluded 
or if Alvin Barker had been permitted to 
testify concerning it, there is a significant 
possibility of a result more favorable to the 
defendant Gary Barker. 
We therefore reverse and remand. 
Robert L. Newey, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code^Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1990). 
2. Deputy Naylor was the only witness called by the 
State who was present when the crime was commi-
tted. Since the jury found for the State, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 
convictions, State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989). We have therefore relied extensively on 
Deputy Naylor's testimony and resolved conflicts 
and doubts in the evidence according to his view of 
the facts. 
3. SeeUtahR.Evid. 801(c). 
4. See United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587-
89 (2d Cir. 1986) cert, denied, _.U.S. 109 3. Ct. 
1003 (1989); United States v. Williams, 751 F.2d 
594, 606-1'J (7th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 
1003 (19S5). 
5. United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 686-87 (7th 
Cir. 1982) cerf. denied 457 U.S. 1124 (1982); United 
States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971); see 
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct. 
838, 844 (1988) (cross-examination requirement of 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) and right of confroniation 
are satisfied where declarant takes the stand and 
responds to questions concerning the out-of-court 
statement despite claimed lack of recall); 4 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence §419 at 
179-81 (1985). 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Frank David GENTRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890145-CA 
FILED: August 24, 1990 
Fifth District, Iron County 
Honorable J. Philip Eves 
ATTORNEYS: 
George T. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and 
Greenwood. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant Frank D. Gentry appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. We reverse and remand. 
Gentry was one of six children born to 
Milton and Ivy Jane Gentry. Milton owned a 
1,840 acre ranch located near the Beaver/ 
Iron County line in southern Utah. In 1949, 
Gentry built a cinder block cabin on the 
ranch. Since that time, Gentry worked the 
ranch on a daily basis and lived in the cabin 
nearly full time. Milton died in 1962 and, by 
holographic will, left the ranch to Ivy Jane 
and their six children. After his father died, 
Gentry continued to work the ranch. In 1966, 
Gentry's siblings and Ivy Jane executed a 
power of attorney authorizing Gentry to 
manage the ranch. When lvv died intestate in 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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1977, Gentry and his siblings each inherited an 
equal share of the ranch. 
Soon after Gentry began managing the 
ranch, antagonism developed between Gentry 
and his siblings. Their relationship eroded and 
the family began to question Gentry's autho-
rity to manage the ranch. The ranch also 
became the subject of a series of lawsuits and 
court-ordered sales. In 1981, as a result of a 
lawsuit to partition the ranch, the district 
court ordered a sale of the ranch. Gentry's 
interest in the ranch was purchased for appr-
oximately S22,000. Gentry objected to the 
validity of the sale, claiming that the payment 
was intended solely to reimburse him for 
improvements and work he had performed on 
the ranch. Several months passed before he 
negotiated the check representing his sale 
proceeds. He allegedly later used the money 
for improvements and upkeep on the ranch. 
After the 1981 partition sale, Gentry conti-
nued to use the ranch. In 1983, Gentry reta-
ined an attorney and attempted to purchase a 
portion of the ranch from two of the owners, 
but did not consummate any purchase. On 
November 10, 1986, Gentry's brothers, Mack 
and Joseph Gentry, each sold their interest in 
the ranch to Dan and Paul Roberts, sons of 
Gentry's sister, Mary Lou. 
In 1986 and 1987, without permission from 
the ranch owners, Gentry and his son, Curtis, 
received payments from Carlyle Stirling for 
grazing on the ranch property. They did not 
transmit any of the monies collected from 
Stirling to the ranch owners. 
Dan and Paul Roberts brought charges of 
theft by deception and criminal trespass 
against Gentry and his son Curtis. Gentry and 
his son countered with a civil suit for quiet 
title and adverse possession against all the 
ranch co-tenants. 
On September 20, 1988, Gentry appeared at 
an arraignment before Judge J. Philip Eves. 
Gentry reviewed and signed an affidavit, 
which set forth the charge of theft, but not the 
alleged facts. Gentry pled not guilty. 
Trial was held before Judge Eves on 
January 25, 1989. After the close of evidence, 
but prior to closing arguments, Gentry 
changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of 
theft, a third degree felony. The State dismi-
ssed the criminal trespass charge. Imposition 
of sentence was stayed pending Gentry's suc-
cessful completion of eighteen months prob-
ation. Conditions of probation included 
Gentry agreeing to 1) not enter the ranch 
property without prior written consent of Paul 
or Dan Roberts, 2) not harass or offensively 
communicate with any family member, 3) 
dismiss his pending civil suit against persons 
holding an ownership interest in the ranch 
property, .and 4) relinquish any interest in the 
property. 
On February 16, 1989, Gentry's counsel 
withdrew. Gentry retained new counsel and on 
February 24, 1989, filed a notice of appeal of 
the trial courfs decision. On April 6, 19SV, 
Gentry, filed a motion and supporting memo-
randum to withdraw his guilty plea and to 
remand for a preliminary hearing. This court 
stayed the appeal for sixty days or until the 
trial court ruled on Gentry's motion to with-
draw his guilty plea. On August 28, 1989, 
Gentry filed a motion for a new trial and a 
motion to disqualify Judge Eves, with supp-
orting memorandum, affidavit of Gentry, and 
certificate of counsel. On September 1, 1989, 
Judge Eves denied Gentry's motion to with-
draw the plea, but did not rule on Gentry's 
other two motions. 
On appeal, Gentry argues that the trial 
court erred by 1) denying Gentry's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea; 2) failing to dispose 
of his motion to disqualify the trial judge; and 
3) failing to dispose of his motion for a new 
trial. Gentry also claims he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel.1 
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA 
Gentry claims the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. Specifically, Gentry argues that 
the trial court failed to explain to Gentry the 
elements and facts of the crime of theft before 
he pled guilty, and that the trial court further 
erred by relying on an incomplete record as a 
substitute for Rule 11 compliance, in determ-
ining that Gentry entered his plea with full 
knowledge and understanding of its consequ-
ences. Gentry also asserts that his hearing 
impairment precluded him from being able to 
fully understand the factual elements of the 
charges during the course of the trial. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1990) states, 
in pertinent part, that "[a] plea of guilty ... 
may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of court." We will 
reverse the denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea only when it clearly appears the 
trial court has abused its discretion by failing 
to find good cause. Srare v. Mildenhall, 141 
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987); State v. Vasilaco-
pulost 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Rule 11(5)2 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
The court may refuse to accept a 
plea of guilty or no contest, and 
may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(d) the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense 
to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elem-
ents.... 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5). 
In cases considered prior to 1987, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the record as a whole 
may affirmatively establish that defendant 
entered his or her guilty plea with full know-
ledge and understanding of its consequences 
and of the rights waived. Srare v. Miller, 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Warner 
v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 
1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987), however, the supreme court modified 
its prior decisions and held that the trial court 
has the burden of ensuring that Rule 11(5) | 
requirements are complied with when a guilty 
plea is entered. Id. at 1312-13. The supreme 
court stated that "to make a knowing guilty 
plea, the defendants must understand the ele-
ments of the crimes charged and the relation-
ship of the law to the facts." Id. at 1312. Gib-
bons noted that a sufficient affidavit may 
be a starting point in determining whether a 
defendant has an adequate understanding; 
however, the court "should then review the 
statements in the affidavit with the defendant, 
question the defendant concerning his under-
standing of it, and fulfill the other requirem-
ents imposed by §77-35-11 on the record 
before accepting the guilty plea." Id. at 1314. 
If a court does not use an affidavit, the req-
uirements in Gibbons and in Rule 11(5) must 
likewise be met and be on the record. Id. 
This court has interpreted Gibbons as effe-
ctively replacing the "record as a whole" test 
with a strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in 
accepting a defendant's guilty plea. Srare v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (per curiam); Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 
94.3 The supreme court also has regarded Gib-
bons as a new rule of criminal procedure, 
constituting a clear break with the past. Stare 
v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah 
1989) (per curiam). Consequently, both Utah 
appellate courts have refused to apply the Gib-
bons strict compliance test to pre-Gibbons guilty 
p l e a s . S e e , e.g., Hickman, 7 7 9 
P.2d at 672 n.l ; Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 
94. 
The State claims, however, that the "record 
as a whole" test remains viable even after Gib-
bons. The State contends that a close 
reading of Gibbons reveals that the supreme 
court was simply pointing out the preferred 
and safest method of determining the volunt-
ariness of a plea. The State reasons that since 
the supreme court was able to review the tra-
nscript and determine that the examination of 
Gibbons was inadequate, it would have rem-
anded the case with an order that the plea be 
withdrawn rather than lemanding for a 
hearing on the issue of voluntariness if it int-
ended to impose a rule'of strict Rule 11 com-
pliance. The State also relies on J olivet v. 
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) and Srare v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) to 
demonstrate that the supreme court, even after 
Gibbons, relies on the "record as a whole" 
test. 
We cannot agree. First, the State misconst-
rues Gibbons. Gibbons does not simply state a 
preferred method for determining the volunt-
ariness of a plea, but clearly mandates that the 
trial court must conduct an on-the-record 
review with defendant of the Rule 11(5) req-
uirements. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-34. 
Also, the supreme court did not remand Gib-
bons for a hearing on the issue of volunt-
ariness, but for the purpose of allowing defe-
ndant to move to withdraw his guilty plea 
because he had not previously filed such 
motion. Id. at 1311. Finally, it appears that 
the court applied the "record as a whole" test 
in Jolivet and Copeland because the guilty 
pleas in both cases were entered before the Gib-
bons decision: Jolivet entered his plea in 
1984, see Srare v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 843-
44 (Utah 1986) (date of plea revealed in 
Jolivet's first appeal), and Copeland entered 
his plea in 1986. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1267. 
In this case the record clearly shows that the 
trial judge failed to comply with Gibbons and 
Rule 11(5). The trial judge did not conduct an 
on-the-record inquiry concerning Gentry's 
understanding of the nature and elements of 
the offense as required by Rule ll(5)(d). The 
trial court simply determined that because 
Gentry was present at trial, he was aware of 
the evidence which had been admitted and the 
charges against him. However, his understa-
nding of the elements of the crime charged 
and how those elements relate to the evidence 
presented may not be presumed from his mere 
presence during trial. See Valencia, 776 P.2d 
at 1335. We further find it particularly nece-
ssary to require strict Rule 11 compliance in 
this instance, where Gentry contends his 
hearing disability prevented him from under-
standing everything that went on during the 
I trial as well as during the proceedings regar-
I ding his guilty plea. 
Rule 11(5) and Gibbons require the vacating 
of Gentry's guilty plea on the ground that it 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made. See 
State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989). 
Thus, we reverse and remand to allow Gentry 
to withdraw his guilty plea and to proceed to a 
new trial on the original charges.4 In light of 
our decision, we do not reach Gentry's other 
claims. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. The State argues that this appeal is moot since 
Gentry will complete his eighteen month probation 
before this court's opinion issues. We do not agree 
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because the conditions of Gentry's probation, incl-
uding his promise to abandon both his pending civil 
action and any interest in ihe ranch, will continue 
despite completion of probation. 
2. In 1989, the subsection in former Rule 11(e) was 
redesignated as Rule 11(5). See 1989 Utah Laws, ch. 
65, §2. 
3. In State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), this court used "the record as a 
whole" language in the opinion, but the issue argued 
by appellant was that he did not voluntarily plead 
guilty, because he mistakenly relied on the state's 
assurance that it would recommend probation rather 
than incarceration. Neither the state nor appellant 
addressed the issue of whether Gibbons had resulted 
in the demise of the "record as a whole" test. The-
refore, we do not read Thurston as supporting the 
state's position in this case. 
4. Usually, when a guilty plea is rescinded the 
parties are to be placed in the position each had 
before the contract was entered into. People v. 
Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 3d 256, 258, 182 Cal. 
Rptr. 426, 428 (1982); see also Wilson v. State, 698 
S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) 
(rejects prior case law dictum that permitting a 
withdrawal of a guilty plea was, in effect, the gra-
nting of a new trial). This case, however, presents 
an unusual factual setting. Although the parties 
represented to the trial court that all the evidence 
had been presented prior to the change of plea, it is 
not clear how Gentry would have proceeded had the 
guilty plea not been entered. Further, Judge Eves 
stated in his decision that the court was prepared to 
determine that Gentry was proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt at the time of trial of both 
charges, even if Gentry had not pled guilty. Since 
neither counsel had presented closing arguments and 
since it is possible that absent the guilty plea Gentry 
would have produced further evidence, we find the 
trial court's declaration of a guilty verdict at the 
time of the plea nonbinding on remand. Conseque-
ntly, we find that a new trial is essential to ensure 
that Gentry has a fair hearing on the charges. 
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